Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

Utah v. Jose Luis C. Vicente : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joan C. Watt; Nisa J. Sisneros; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; counsel for appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; counsel for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Vicente, No. 20000955 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2964

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOSE LUIS C. VICENTE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20000955-CA
Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for attempted possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding.
JOAN C. WATT (3967)
NISA J. SISNEROS (6654)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
HeberM. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

MAR 2 b 2001
Pauiette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOSE LUIS C. VICENTE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20000955-CA
Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appealfroma judgment of conviction for attempted possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding.
JOAN C. WATT (3967)
NISA J. SISNEROS (6654)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
HeberM. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW,
PRESERVATION

1

TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT IN ABSENTIA TO THE
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SENTENCE WITHOUT ANY
INPUT FROM EITHER PARTY
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS
AND UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22 WHEN HE SENTENCED
VICENTE WITHOUT CONSIDERING RELEVANT
AND RELIABLE INFORMATION AND WITHOUT
AFFORDING THE PARTIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO
SPEAK AT SENTENCING
B. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS
AND UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22 BY SENTENCING
VICENTE IN ABSENTIA
1. The Record Does Not Demonstrate a Knowing
Waiver of the Right to Presence at Sentencing

8

9

15

15

Page
2. The Public Interest Did Not Require That
Vicente Be Sentenced in Absentia
CONCLUSION

24
27

Addendum A: Judgment
Addendum B: Sentencing Transcript
Addendum C: Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence
Addendum D: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Addendum E: Text of Rules and Constitutional Provisions

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Crosby v. United States. 506 U.S. 255, 113 S.Ct. 748,
122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993)

17

Lowerv v. State. 759 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1988)

21

People v. Bennett. 557 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)

21

People v. Christopher R.. 522 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987)

21

People v. Harris. 564N.Y.S.2d481 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991)

21

People v. Link. 685 N.E.2d 624 (111. App. 1997)

21

People v. Parker. 440N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1982)

25

Smith v. Mann. 173 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1999), cert, denied.
120 S.Ct. 200
State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996)

25
2,15,16,17,18,
24,25, 26

State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989), cert, denied.
497 U.S. 1024 (1990)

3

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

3, 13

State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989)

3

State v. Fettis. 664 P.2d 208 (Ariz. 1983)
State v. Ham. 910 P.2d433 (Utah App. 1996)
State v. Houtz. 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986)

19, 20
2
15

iii

Page
State v. Howell. 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985)

4, 9, 10

State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996)

4, 14

State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993)

2, 3,9, 10, 11, 13

State v. Labrum. 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996)

3

State v. Lipskv. 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980)

4, 9, 11

State v. McClendon. 611 P.2d 728 (Utah 1980)

13

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

2

Tavlor v. United States. 414 U.S.17 (1973)

18

United States v. Fontanez. 878 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1989)

24, 25

United States v. Lastra. 973 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

19

United States v. McPherson. 421 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1969)

15,16,17,18

United States v. Turner. 532 F. Supp. 913 (1982)
Williams v. New York. 337 U.S. 341 (1949)

19, 20
9, 11

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (1999)

14

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996)

1

Fed. R. Crim. P. 43

17

Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2)

5, 22

iv

Page
Utah R. Crim. P. 22

1, 3,4, 5, 7, 9,
10,13,15,21

U.S. Const, amend. VI

15

U.S. Const, amend. XIV

5

Utah Const, art. I, § 7

5

Utah Const, art. I, § 12

4, 5,15,16,21, 22

v

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOSE LUIS C. VICENTE,

:

Case No. 20000955-CA

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah sentenced Defendant/Appellant Jose Luis C. Vicente
("Appellant" or "Vicente") and entered judgment of conviction for possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, a class A misdemeanor. A copy of the Judgment is in
Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION
Issue. Whether the trial judge violated due process, Appellant's right to appear
and defend, and Utah R. Crim. P. 22 when he sentenced Appellant in absentia to the
maximum sentence without affording defense counsel or the state an opportunity to speak
at sentencing.

Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996) (issue of whether
defendant was properly sentenced in absentia involves a question of law). In addition, the
ultimate issue as to whether Appellant voluntarily absented himself from sentencing is
reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah App.
1996) (reviewing ultimate issue of whether consent to search was voluntary for
correctness). While a trial judge ordinarily has discretion in sentencing, such discretion is
not unlimited. See State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) (recognizing trial
court exceeds its discretion when it fails to sentence based on reliable and relevant
information, and reviewing question of whether trial judge sentenced defendant based on
reliable and relevant information as a question of law). Any underlying factual findings
are reviewed for clear error. See generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994)
(factual findings are reviewed for clear error).
Preservation. Although defense counsel was not given an opportunity to speak, the
trial court nevertheless considered the issue of whether it was appropriate to proceed, and
concluded that Appellant had voluntarily absented himself (R. 67[2]:l-2). A copy of the
sentencing transcript is in Addendum B. The trial judge had considered this issue before,
as indicated in his statement, "this is yet another sentencing on which we have neither an
appearance of the defendant or a report" (R. 67[2]:1). He sentenced Manuel Samora,
whose appeal is before this Court in Case No. 20000884-CA, on the same day. In
2

addition, trial counsel filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, a copy of which is in
Addendum C.
The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, a copy of which is
in Addendum D (R. 48-49). In fact, although the parties were never given the opportunity
to address the issue of whether proceeding in absentia was appropriate under the
circumstances of the case, the prosecutor was able to preparefindingsand conclusions on
that issue. Because the trial court considered this issue below and entered an order, it is
properly preserved for appellate review. See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah
1989) (purpose of requiring that an issue be raised in the trial court is to allow the trial
judge to review the issue and correct an error).1
Alternatively, the trial judge committed plain error in proceeding in absentia and in
failing to base the sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information without
affording defense counsel the opportunity to speak. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071; Utah
R. Crim. P. 22; State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (plain error occurs
1

The purposes of the preservation rules are to: (1) allow the trial court the
opportunity to review and correct any errors, and (2) preclude defense counsel from
foregoing objections as a matter of strategy and when the strategy does not work and
defendant is convicted, claiming error. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 36; State v. Labrum. 925
P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,
497 U.S. 1024 (1990). In this case where the trial judge reviewed the issue of whether to
proceed in absentia at sentencing and entered findings and conclusions on that issue and
again had the opportunity to review the issue when the motion to correct an illegal
sentence wasfiled,both of those purposes were met. The trial court had the opportunity
to review the issue and correct the error, and no possible trial strategy existed for
foregoing the objection. Accordingly, the issue was properly preserved for appeal.
3

when an error is obvious and prejudices the defendant). State v. Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241,
1247 (Utah 1980) (due process requires foil and fair sentencing hearing and sentence
which fits offender and the crime); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985) (state due
process requires that sentence be based on reliable and relevant information regarding
various factors). Pursuant to due process and Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a), the error in failing
to conduct a foil sentencing hearing was obvious as was the denial of Vicente's right to
presence at sentencing pursuant to Article I, section 12, Utah Constitution. The obvious
error prejudiced Vicente since he received the maximum sentence when he otherwise was
a candidate for probation; see discussion infra at 11.
Finally, the issue should also be reviewed because exceptional circumstances
justifying review exist in this case. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996).
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) requires a trial judge to afford defendant the opportunity to
provide relevant information at sentencing; due process requires the judge to conduct a
foil and fair sentencing hearing. See e ^ Lipskv, 608 P.2d at 1247. Where the judge
does not afford counsel the opportunity to speak and does not conduct a foil and fair
sentencing hearing, a procedural anomaly requiring review exists. See Irwin, 924 P.2d at
11 (exceptional circumstances doctrine generally applies to rare procedural anomalies).
In addition, the question of whether the trial judge imposed a legal sentence is of
widespread interest as evidenced by the number of cases before this Court raising a
similar issue. Id. (doctrine of exceptional circumstances may be applied where "matters
4

of extraordinary importance or widespread interest" exist). Without appellate review, the
egregious violation of due process, Utah R. Crim. P. 22 and the right to presence which
occurred in this case would go unchecked. In this case where the trial judge had the
obligation to conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing and failed to do so, exceptional
circumstances require that this Court review the issue on appeal.
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following rules and constitutional provisions is in Addendum E:
Utah R. Crim. 17(a)(2);
Utah R. Crim. P. 22;
Utah Const, art. I, § 7;
Utah Const, art. I, § 12;
U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 7, 2000, the state charged Vicente with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, on or about March 4,
2000 (R. 02). On August 15, 2000, Vicente pled guilty to attempted unlawful possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute, a class A misdemeanor, before the Honorable
William W. Barrett (R. 67[l]:l-5). Judge Barrett scheduled sentencing for September 8,
2000 before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick (R. 33, 35). When Vicente failed to
appear at sentencing subsequently scheduled for September 22,2000, Judge Frederick
sentenced Vicente to the maximum one year sentence (R. 44-45). This appeal follows.

5

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
According to the probable cause statement in the Information, a police officer
followed another individual to a residence where Vicente answered the door (R. 03). The
officer searched the residence and found five ounces of marijuana and a drug scale
(R. 03).
At the plea colloquy before Judge Barrett, defense counsel indicated that the state
would recommend thirty days jail with credit for time served (R. 67[1]:1). Vicente had
served 15-20 days in jail when he pled guilty, and was released pending sentencing. The
record contains a form indicating the date of sentencing as September 8, 2000 and
referring Vicente to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for a presentence report (R. 33).
The form is in English. Vicente speaks Spanish and had an interpreter at the plea
colloquy (R. 67[l]:l-5,23).
Although Judge Barrett told Vicente (through an interpreter) at the plea hearing
that he must go to AP&P for a presentence report, the judge did not tell Vicente when he
must go or the location of the AP&P office (R. 67[l]:4-5). Judge Barrett also did not tell
Vicente on the record at the plea hearing the date on which sentencing would be held
(R. 67[1]). Nothing in the record demonstrates that Vicente was informed in Spanish of
the date of sentencing or that sentencing would occur before Judge Frederick.
On September 11, 2000, Judge Frederick revoked Vicente's release and issued an
arrest warrant because Vicente had not appeared at AP&P for preparation of a
6

presentence report (R. 41). Sentencing was somehow rescheduled for September 22,
2000. The record does not reflect whether Vicente appeared at the courtroom of Judge
Barrett or Judge Frederick on September 8, 2000 or whether Vicente was informed of the
change in sentencing date.
On September 22, 2000, when Vicente did not appear before Judge Frederick for
sentencing, without affording either party the opportunity to speak, Judge Frederick
concluded that Vicente had voluntarily absented himself (R. 67[2]:l-2). Despite the
recommendation of thirty days jail with credit for time served, Judge Frederick sentenced
Vicente to the maximum one year jail sentence (R. 44).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial judge violated Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process by failing to afford
the parties an opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing and by otherwise
failing to base the sentence on relevant information or to conduct a full and fair
sentencing hearing. Imposing a maximum sentence based solely on the failure to appear
without considering the nature and circumstances of the crime, defendant's background or
society's interests and without affording the parties the opportunity to present information
relevant to sentencing violates the rule and due process and requires a new sentencing
hearing.
The trial judge further violated due process and the Rules of Criminal Procedure
by sentencing Appellant in absentia. Appellant did not knowingly waive his right to
7

presence at sentencing in this case where the record does not establish that Appellant was
informed of the September 22, 2000 sentencing date or that Judge Frederick would
sentence him, and Appellant was not informed that he would be sentenced even if he were
not present. The critical role of presence at sentencing requires that the right to presence
not be lightly forfeited. In this case where Appellant did not waive his right to be present
at sentencing, the trial court erred in sentencing him in absentia and the sentence must be
vacated.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT IN ABSENTIA TO THE
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SENTENCE WITHOUT ANY INPUT
FROM EITHER PARTY.
Judge Frederick began the sentencing proceeding by stating, "this is yet another
sentencing on which we have neither an appearance of the defendant or a report, is that
correct, [Defense Counsel]?" (R. 67[2]:1). Without affording either party an opportunity
to speak, Judge Frederick then stated:
The defendant entered a plea of guilty on the, to a Class A
Misdemeanor crime of attempted possession with intent to distribute and
was given both oral and written notice to appear for the preparation of presentence report, failed to do so and has failed likewise to appear here today
notwithstanding both written and oral notice to do so.
It is my view, therefore, he has likewise voluntarily chosen not to
appear and I will impose sentence accordingly. It is the judgment of this
court that he serve the term provided by law in the Adult Detention Center
one year for the Class A Misdemeanor crime and I will order a fine be
8

imposed of $2,500 plus a surcharge on the fine and commitment issued
forthwith upon his arrest.
(R. 67[2]:l-2). Judge Frederick then ordered the prosecutor to "likewise" prepare
findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 67[2]:2).
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R.
CRIM. P. 22 WHEN HE SENTENCED VICENTE WITHOUT
CONSIDERING RELEVANT AND RELIABLE INFORMATION AND
WITHOUT AFFORDING THE PARTIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO
SPEAK AT SENTENCING.
The state and federal due process clauses lfrequire[] that a sentencing judge act on
reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing sentence."
Howejl, 707 P.2d at 118; see also Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071 (state and federal due
process protections applicable to sentencing require that judge make sentencing decision
based on reliable and relevant information); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 341 (1949)
(due process requires full and fair sentencing hearing where sentencer imposes sentence
which fits offender and the crime); Lipsky. 608 P.2d at 1247 (same). A sentence which is
not based on reliable and relevant information must be vacated. See id. at 1071-75
(vacating sentence based on unreliable hearsay report).
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) further attempts to effectuate the due process requirement
of a fiill and fair sentencing hearing based on relevant and reliable information by
requiring sentencing judges to give both the defendant and the prosecutor an opportunity

9

to present any information which might be material to the sentence. Utah R. Crim. P.
22(a) states in part:
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an
opportunity to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be
imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to
present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added); see Howell 707 P.2d at 118 ("[t]o ensure
fairness in the sentencing procedure, [Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)] directs trial courts to hear
evidence from both the defendant and the prosecution that is relevant to the sentence to be
imposed").
The plain language of Rule 22(a) places on the trial court the responsibility to
afford defense counsel the opportunity to speak at sentencing and to present information
relevant to sentencing.2 While Rule 22(a) mandates that the trial court give the parties the
opportunity to speak at sentencing, due process as outlined in Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071,
and Howell 707 P.2d at 118, requires that any sentence imposed by trial judges be based
on reliable and relevant information. Working together, Rule 22(a) and due process
require a trial judge to make sure that a fair and full sentencing hearing which meets due
process requirements occurs.

2

Where a defendant is represented by counsel, defendant presents information
through defense counsel.
10

In this case, the trial court did not afford defense counsel or the prosecutor the
opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing. Failure to hold a full
sentencing hearing and the concomitant failure to base the sentencing decision on
complete and accurate information requires a new sentencing hearing pursuant to
Johnson, Lipsky and Williams. In a case such as the present one where the trial judge did
not afford defense counsel or the prosecutor the opportunity to present information
pertinent to the sentencing decision, conducting a harmless error review would undermine
the due process requirement of a full and fair sentencing hearing. Since defense counsel
was not given the opportunity to present relevant information, complete information
favorable to the defendant is not in the record. Moreover, the prosecutor had agreed to
recommend that Vicente serve thirty days jail with credit for time served and then be
placed on probation. Judge Frederick, who was not at the plea hearing when this
agreement was made, was unaware of this recommendation. Since complete information
mitigating the sentence is not in the record, conducting a harmless error review is difficult
and not required under Johnson.
Nonetheless, if this Court were to attempt a review for prejudice, the record in this
case demonstrates harm caused by the court's failure to afford counsel the opportunity to
consider information relevant to sentencing. The record demonstrates that the state was
willing to recommend a relatively short jail sentence of thirty days (R. 67[1]:1). Nothing
in the record suggests that this crime or Vicente's background required a more severe
11

sentence. Had Judge Frederick conducted a full and fair sentencing hearing, he would
have been aware of the state's recommendation and the circumstances which supported it.
Probation, not the maximum sentence, would have been likely.
Vicente's nonappearance at sentencing does not alter the circumstances as to
permit imposition of a maximum sentence. First, failing to appear at sentencing is
punishable by other means and should not enter into the sentencing matrix. For example,
a defendant who fails to appear at sentencing can be charged with a separate crime or held
on a bench warrant after not appearing. In addition, if the judge sentences a defendant in
absentia, the defendant loses the right to allocution which can play an important role in
mitigating sentence; see discussion infra at 14-25 regarding impropriety of sentencing in
absentia.
Common sense dictates that imposing a maximum sentence based solely on a
failure to appear at sentencing can result in sentences which are not appropriate in light of
society's interests, the nature of the crime or the defendant's background, and which
impact profoundly on criminal justice resources. Filling the jail with misdemeanants
serving maximum sentences who are irresponsible regarding their court dates but who
otherwise do not present a threat to society nor deserve severe punishment makes little
sense. Instead, the sentencing decision is more appropriately based on a complete review
of the nature of the crime and the background of the defendant.

12

Additionally, even if nonappearance at sentencing were considered in determining
the appropriate sentence, it would be only one of several factors to be considered.
"A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of his
background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which
underlie the criminal justice system." State v. McClendon. 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah
1980). In other words, pursuant to McClendon, Johnson and due process, a sentence must
be based not only on the circumstances of the crime, but also on other factors such as the
defendant's background and the interests of society. The crime in this case where
Vicente pled guilty to attempting to possess marijuana was relatively benign. Nothing in
the record suggests Vicente had an extensive criminal history or was involved in violence,
and the state recommended a short jail sentence with probation. Under these
circumstances, probation was likely and Vicente was prejudiced by the judge's failure to
conduct a full sentencing hearing.
As a final matter, even if this issue was not adequately preserved for review by the
trial judge's ruling, it nevertheless was plain error requiring that the sentence be vacated.
The error in failing to afford defense counsel the opportunity to speak on behalf of her
client and in otherwise failing to base the sentencing decision on reliable and relevant
information was obvious in light of Rule 22(a) and Johnson. See generally Dunn, 850
P.2d at 1208-09 (plain error occurs where error is obvious and prejudices defendant). The
obviousness of the error in failing to afford counsel the opportunity to present information
13

relevant to sentencing is bolstered by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (7) (1999) which
mandates that the trial judge receive any information regarding the appropriate sentence
which the parties desire to present, and that such information "be presented in open court
on the record and in the presence of the defendant.11 Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (7)
(1999).
While this due process error requires vacation of the sentence regardless of
whether prejudice is apparent in the record (see discussion supra at 10), even if prejudice
were required, the record demonstrates that Vicente was harmed by the judge's failure to
conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing. As outlined supra at 11, the error in failing to
afford defense counsel the opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing
prejudiced Vicente since the trial judge was not fully informed of the nature and
circumstances of the crime or the state's recommendation for a lenient sentence. Had the
trial judge been fully informed and considered all relevant and reliable information,
probation would have been the appropriate sentence.
In addition, exceptional circumstances require review of this issue. See Irwin, 924
P.2d at 11. The irregular procedure which occurred in this case whereby the judge
sentenced Vicente in absentia without affording either party the opportunity to speak is an
exceptional circumstance which requires review. See discussion supra at 4. Without
review, the flagrant violation of Vicente's right to due process which occurred in this case
would not be scrutinized nor corrected.
14

B. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R.
CRIM. P. 22 BY SENTENCING VICENTE IN ABSENTIA.
In addition to failing to comply with Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process in
conducting the sentencing hearing without affording counsel the opportunity to present
relevant information, Judge Frederick violated Rule 22, due process and Article I,
section 12, Utah Constitution by sentencing Vicente in absentia. Article I, section 12,
Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee
the right to be present at sentencing. See Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1109-10; United States v.
McPherson. 421 F.2d 1127, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Because the right to presence at
sentencing is constitutionally guaranteed, the trial judge may not proceed in absentia
unless the defendant waives the right to presence.
1. The Record Does Not Demonstrate a Knowing Waiver of the Right to
Presence at Sentencing.
Any waiver of the right to be present at sentencing "must be voluntary and involve
an intentional relinquishment of a known right.11 Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110 (further
citation omitted). The burden is on the state to establish waiver, and a knowing and
voluntary waiver may not be presumed by the trial court. State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677,
678-79 (Utah 1986).
In order to knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to presence at sentencing, the
defendant must, at the very least, be given notice of the proceedings. Anderson. 929 P.2d
at 1110. In addition, the directive given the defendant must provide sufficient warning
15

that the hearing will proceed even if the defendant is not present for a knowing waiver of
the right to presence to occur. McPherson. 421 F.2d at 1129-30.
In Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111, the Supreme Court held that sentencing the
defendant in absentia did not violate the defendant's right to allocution where the
defendant was informed of the trial date and signed a written waiver of his right to be
present. Id. at 1110-11. The Court recognized that the right to allocution at sentencing
"is an inseparable part of the right to be present" found in Article I, section 12, Utah
Constitution. Id. at 1111. Anderson waived his right to allocution by his voluntary
absence after being informed of the trial date, his execution of a written waiver of his
right to be present, his failure to appear at trial, and his failure to keep in touch with
counsel or appear at sentencing. Id. at 1110-11.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Anderson is consistent with the McPherson
approach of requiring that the defendant be informed that the proceeding will be held
without him in order to have a knowing waiver3, and must be read in light of the facts and
policy considerations relevant to the circumstances under which Anderson failed to

3

McPherson focused on the nature of the communication with the defendant, i.e.
on whether the defendant was informed the hearing would proceed in his absence, in
determining whether the defendant knowingly waived his right to presence. McPherson,
421 F.2d at 1129-30. In fact, although the trial judge in McPherson made it clear that the
defendant was to be present at sentencing and that serious consequences would occur if
he was not, the appellate court concluded that a knowing waiver of the right to presence
did not occur where the record did not show that the defendant was informed that the trial
would proceed without him. Id.
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appear. Because Anderson was warned of the consequences of failing to appear and had
signed a written waiver of his right to presence in which he agreed to be tried in absentia,
requiring that the defendant be warned of the consequences of nonappearance in order to
find a knowing waiver of the right to presence fits squarely within the Anderson holding.
See Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110. Relying on McPherson. the Anderson court stated, M[t]o
intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must have notice of the
proceedings." Id. (citing McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1130). Since the notice required in
McPherson was that sentencing would proceed without the defendant if he did not appear,
this reliance on McPherson in Anderson requires that the defendant be given notice that
the sentencing will occur even if he does not appear in order to sentence in absentia.
Requiring that a defendant be informed that sentencing will proceed without him
for there to be a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence is also consistent
with United States Supreme Court case law interpreting Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. See Crosby
v. United States. 506 U.S. 255,256,113 S.Ct. 748, 749, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). In
Crosby, the Court recognized that it cannot be assumed that a defendant who fails to
appear knows that a trial will go on without him. In fact, "'[s]ince the notion that trial
may be commenced in absentia still seems to shock most lawyers, it would hardly seem
appropriate to impute knowledge that this will occur to their clients.'" Crosby. 506 U.S.
at 261 (citation omitted). Moreover, while under the federal rules, a trial may continue to
conclusion when a defendant disappears after the trial has begun, a trial in absentia is not
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permitted if the defendant fails to appear at the beginning of trial. Id. at 262 (citing
Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S.17 (1973)). In making a distinction between absenting
oneself mid-trial and not appearing at the beginning of trial for purposes of determining
whether a defendant waived his right to presence, the Supreme Court recognized that a
defendant who flees mid-trial knows that the trial has begun and will proceed without him
whereas a defendant who does not appear at the beginning of trial has no such knowledge.
Hence, while a knowing waiver of the right to presence occurs when a defendant flees
mid-trial, a knowing waiver is not demonstrated when the defendant fails to appear at all.
Although Anderson supports the McPherson approach, it also fails to control the
issue before this Court because it involved circumstances which are different from those
in the present case. The trial court properly tried Anderson in absentia based on a written
waiver of the right to presence. In determining whether the subsequent sentencing could
also be conducted in absentia, the Court looked to cases involving similar circumstances
where a defendant was properly tried in absentia and had not shown up by the time of
sentencing. Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110. Because it would create an anomaly to be able
to try in absentia a defendant who affirmatively waived his right to presence but then be
unable to sentence him, the Supreme Court held that sentencing Anderson in absentia
after he had expressly waived his right to presence at trial was appropriate. Id. The
Anderson court did not consider the current circumstances, however, where a defendant

18

who had not been informed at the plea hearing that sentencing would occur without him
later failed to appear at sentencing.
Moreover, because presence of the defendant at sentencing is even more critical
than it is at trial, the right to presence at sentencing cannot be lightly forfeited. See
United States v. Turner, 532 F. Supp. 913, 915 (1982); State v. Fettis. 664 P.2d 208, 209
(Ariz. 1983). ,f[T]he common law has traditionally required that the defendant be present
at his sentencing.11 Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915; United States v. Lastra, 973 F.2d 952,
955 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) ("The requirement that the defendant be present
when sentence is passed has deep common law origins.5"). Presence is of critical
importance to sentencing not only because it allows the judge to be presented with all of
the information needed for a foil and fair sentencing, but also because it allows the judge
to question and admonish the defendant. Indeed, "[i]t is only when the defendant is
before the court that a reasonable and rational sentencing can take place." Fettis, 664
P.2d at 209.
Presence is of instrumental value to the defendant for the exercise of other
rights, such as to present mitigating evidence and challenge aggravating
evidence, and it may also be advantageous to him that the decision maker
be required to face him. The state may have an interest in the presence of
the defendant in order that the example of personal admonition might deter
others from similar crimes. Moreover, it may sometimes be important that
the convicted man be called to account publicly for what he has done, not to
be made an instrument of the general deterrent, but to acknowledge
symbolically his personal responsibility for his acts and to receive
personally the official expression of society's condemnation for his
conduct. The ceremonial rendering of judgment may also contribute to the
19

individual deterrent force of the sentence if the latter is accompanied by
appropriate judicial comment on the defendant's crime.
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915.
Presence of the defendant at sentencing also preserves the dignity of the
individuals being sentenced as well as the court and the system itself.
Respect for the dignity of the individual is at the base of the right of a man
to be present when society authoritatively proceeds to decide and announce
whether it will deprive him of liberty. It shows a fundamental lack of
respect for the dignity of a man to sentence him in absentia. The presence
of the defendant indicates that society has sufficient confidence in the
justness of its judgment to announce it in public to the convicted man
himself. Presence thus enhances the legitimacy and acceptability of both
sentence and conviction.
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The important
policy considerations relating to presence at sentencing require that the right to presence
at sentencing not be easily waived. See id. at 915 (important policy considerations
supporting right to presence at sentencing "militate against a rule allowing presence at
sentencing to be lightly waived").
Because of the critical importance of presence to sentencing, many jurisdictions
refuse to allow sentencing in absentia except in extraordinary circumstances. Fettis, 664
P.2d at 209. Such extraordinary circumstances, while "rare indeed" (id.), may include
circumstances where a defendant has expressly waived his right to be present at
sentencing. See Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 916 (citation omitted). Extraordinary
circumstances allowing sentencing in absentia may also include circumstances where the
20

defendant has been folly informed that sentencing will proceed in his absence if he does
not appear at the sentencing hearing. See Lowery v. State. 759 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Ark.
1988) (court unwilling to find defendant waived the right to presence at sentencing "in the
absence of language specifically advising an accused that he is subject to being sentenced
prospectively without his being present"); People v. Link, 685 N.E.2d 624, 626 (111. App.
1997) (court requires that defendant must be "warned his failure to appear may result in
the proceedings continuing in absentia" in order to sentence a defendant in absentia);
People v. Bennett. 557 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (court reasons that
sentencing in absentia was permissible where defendant was fully advised that sentencing
would occur in his absence if he failed to appear); People v. Harris, 564 N.Y.S.2d 481
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (same); People v. Christopher R.. 522 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1987) (same). These cases support the notion that at the very least, a defendant must be
informed that the sentencing will occur even if he is not present in order to knowingly
waive his right to presence.
While Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) facilitates due process and the Article I, section 12,
Utah Constitution right to appear and defend by allowing a defendant to speak and
present information relevant to sentencing, Rule 22(b) allows sentencing to proceed even
though the defendant is not present "[o]n the same grounds that a defendant may be tried
in defendant's absence." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b). The grounds on which a defendant may
be tried in his absence are circumstances where the defendant has knowingly and
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voluntarily waived his right to presence; in the context of sentencing, a knowing waiver
does not occur unless the defendant has been informed that the sentencing will proceed
even if he is not present.
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2), which recognizes that in order to proceed in absentia at
trial, the defendant must knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to presence, does not
affect the determination of whether the constitutional right to presence at sentencing was
waived. Utah R. Crim P. 17(a)(2) states in part, "[i]n prosecutions for offenses not
punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or
judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present."
While this rule suggests that voluntary absence from trial after notice of the time for trial
constitutes a knowing waiver of the right to presence at trial, it does not outline what
constitutes a knowing waiver of the right to presence at sentencing. More importantly,
even if Rule 17(a)(2) applied to sentencing hearings rather than trial, the Article I,
section 12 right to presence at sentencing would override the rule. Because of the greater
importance of presence at sentencing, the fundamental, common law roots in requiring
presence at sentencing and the lack of awareness by most people that a sentencing will be
held if the defendant is not present, the right to presence at sentencing cannot be waived
except in extraordinary circumstances which may include circumstances where the
defendant was informed that the sentencing would be held even if he did not appear.
22

In the present case, the record fails to demonstrate that Vicente knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to be present at sentencing. Vicente speaks Spanish, used an
interpreter at the plea hearing and signed a plea form which was in English and Spanish
(R. 23, 24, 33, 35, 67[l]:l-5). At the plea hearing, Judge Barrett referred Vicente to
AP&P and told Vicente, through an interpreter, he must go to AP&P for the preparation
of a presentence report (R. 67[l]:4-5). Judge Barrett did not, however, orally state that
Vicente must return for sentencing or the date on which the sentencing would be held or
the fact that the sentencing would be held before a different judge, Judge Frederick
(R. 67[l]:l-5). Judge Frederick's finding that Vicente was orally informed of the
sentencing date is therefore clearly erroneous.
The record also fails to demonstrate that Vicente was informed of the
September 22, 2000 sentencing date. The district court file contains a copy of a form
which was filled out on the date of the plea hearing and which indicates that sentencing is
to be held on September 8, 2000 (R. 33). That form is in English and there is nothing in
the record demonstrating that the information in the form was conveyed to Vicente in
Spanish. Moreover, sentencing was somehow rescheduled for September 22, 2000, and
there is nothing in the record indicating that Vicente was ever informed of that date.
Vicente may well have appeared in the courtroom of Judge Frederick or Judge Barrett on
September 8, 2000. While the record does demonstrate that Vicente was informed in
Spanish at the plea hearing that he needed to go to AP&P for preparation of a presentence
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report, the failure to go to AP&P does not establish that Vicente knew of the sentencing
date and knowingly failed to appear. In addition, Vicente was not informed that
sentencing would proceed without him if he did not appear.
Because Vicente was not informed of the sentencing date and, further, was not
informed that sentencing would proceed without him, Judge Frederick incorrectly
concluded that Vicente knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to presence at
sentencing. The trial judge therefore erred in sentencing Vicente in absentia.
2. The Public Interest Did Not Require That Vicente Be Sentenced in
Absentia.
In determining whether the right to presence has been waived thereby allowing for
sentencing in absentia, a trial court must also weigh whether the public interest in
proceeding without the defendant outweighs the defendant's interest in being present.
See Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1111 (court relies on practical considerations which supported
proceeding with the sentencing in absentia); United States v. Fontanez. 878 F.2d 33, 36
(2d Cir. 1989) (court considers whether public interest in proceeding with sentencing in
absentia outweighed defendant's interest in being present in deciding whether to uphold
sentencing in absentia).
In Anderson, the Supreme Court upheld the sentencing in absentia after concluding
that"[practical considerations . . . mitigate[d] in favor of in absentia sentencing."
Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1111. Anderson had executed a written waiver of his right to be
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present, then left the state. The Court was concerned that Anderson could absent himself
for years "and the eventual sentencing would have to be performed by a judge who was
unfamiliar with the case and had no access to relevant information." Id.
Concerns about dilatory defendants who attempt to delay the administration of
justice by failing to appear at sentencing are remedied by requiring trial judges to exercise
their discretion to proceed in absentia by balancing "the public interest in proceeding
[without the defendant]" against the defendant's interest in being present. Smith v. Mann,
173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 120 S.Ct. 200; see also Fontanez, 878 F.2d at
36-37; People v. Parker, 440 N.E.2d 131, 137 (N.Y. 1982). Requiring that trial courts
balance the public interest in proceeding against the defendant's interest in being present
ensures that trial courts "vigorously safeguard" the right to presence. Fontanez, 878 F.2d
at 36.
The factors to be considered when balancing the public interest in proceeding in
absentia against the defendant's interest in being present include whether there is a
possibility that the defendant could be contacted and brought to court within a reasonable
amount of time, the difficulty in rescheduling the sentencing hearing, the burden on the
state in not proceeding, and whether there is a possibility that information relevant to
sentencing will be lost. See Parker, 440 N.E.2d at 1317; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 36;
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111.

25

In this case, Judge Frederick erred in sentencing Vicente in absentia where the
judge did not balance the public interest in proceeding against Vicente's interest in being
present, and the record fails to demonstrate that the public interest required that Vicente
be sentenced in absentia. Continuing the sentencing hearing to another date would not
have been difficult; sentencing hearings take a relatively short amount of time and are
often rescheduled. The state would not have been burdened by a continuance since it
presented no information pertinent to sentencing; the state could have easily done the
same thing if the sentencing had been rescheduled, and there was no threat that
information relevant to sentencing would be lost if sentencing were rescheduled. Since
Judge Frederick had taken the case from another judge, was not present when the plea
was taken and had no specific knowledge that would be lost, the public had no interest in
maintaining him as the judge; even if a delay in sentencing caused reassignment of the
case, information pertinent to sentencing would not be lost and the effective
administration of justice would not be undermined since Judge Frederick did not sit
through the trial as the Anderson judge had, and did not take the plea.
Vicente's fundamental, critical interest in being present for sentencing was not
outweighed by the public interest in proceeding. The trial judge therefore erred in
sentencing Vicente in absentia and the sentence must be vacated.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Jose Vicente respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
sentence and remand his case for a full and fair sentencing hearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ZOU day of March, 2001.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

NISA J. SISNEROS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies
of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. 0. Box
140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this JjQttL day of March, 2001.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's
Office as indicated above this

day of March, 2001.
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 991907447 FS

JOSE LUIS CASTRO VICENTE,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Judge:
Date:

J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Sentember 22. 2000

PRESENT
Clerk:
cindyb
Prosecutor: MURPHY, J KEVIN
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): SISNEROS, NISA J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Language: S PANISH
Date of birth: May 4, 1973
Video
Tape Number:
1
Tape Count: 10:39-10:40
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST (amended)
Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/15/2000 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED POSS W/INTENT TO
DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s)
Commitment is to begin immediately.

Case No: 991907447
Date:
Sep 22, 2000

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$2500.00
$0.00
$2125.00
$4625.00
$2500.00
$0
$2125.00
$4625.00
Plus Interest

Pay fine to The Court.
The Court finds defendant voluntarily absented himself from
sentencing proceedings and the Court sentences the defendant in
absentia. Counsel for the State to prepare the findings and order.
Defendant to be committed forthwith upon his arrest on this
Court's bench waifrant.

Mr
Dated t h i s

/ A ' d a y of
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 991907447 FS

Plaintifi/Appellee,

JOSE LUIS C. VINCENTE,
Defendant/Appellant
August 15, 2000
September 22,2000

PLEA HEARING
SENTENCING

Page 1
Tab 2

BEFORE
THE HONORABLES J. DENNIS FREDERICK and WILLIAM W. BARRETT

«

•

5

"\

FILED
3EC 0 / 2UUU
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRmfiP U R T OF APPEAL^
1775 E. Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

6UXOC0&5 -cK

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

J. KEVIN MURPHY
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
231 East 400 South #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

For the Defendant:

NISA J. SISNEROS
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
* * *

1

SALT LAKE COUNTY; UTAH SEPTEMBER 22, 2000

2

HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4
5

THE COURT: All right, Miss Sisneros, thank you. Do
you have any other matter, another non-show right?

6

MS. SISNEROS: One other, a Jose Vicente, number 24.

7

THE COURT: Very well this is yet another sentencing

8

on which we have neither an appearance of the Defendant or a

9

report, is that correct, Ms. Sisneros?

10

MS. SISNEROS:

11

THE COURT: And you have no knowledge as to this

12

That is correct.

Defendant's present whereabouts likewise?

13

MS. SISNEROS: No, I don't.

14

THE COURT:

In this matter, this is case number

15

CR997447, the Defendant entered a plea of guilty on the, to a

16

Class A Misdemeanor crime of attempted possession with intent

17

to distribute and was given both oral and written notice to

18

appear for the preparation of pre-sentence report, failed to do

19

so and has failed likewise to appear here today not

20

withstanding both written and oral notice to do so.

21

It is my view therefore, he has likewise voluntarily

22

chosen not to appear and I will impose sentence accordingly. It

23

is the judgment of this court that he serve the term provided

24

by law in the Adult Detention Center one year for the Class A

25

Misdemeanor crime and I will order a fine be imposed of $2,500
1

1

plus a surcharge on the fine and commitment issued forthwith

2

upon his arrest.

3

Likewise Mr. Murphy findings of fact and conclusions and order.

A warrant has been previously issued.

4

MR. MURPHY: Yes, Your Honor.

5

THE COURT: All right, Ms. Sisneros does that take

6

care of your matters?

7

MS. SISNEROS: That's all I have Your Honor.

8

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

9

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded).
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in
the before mentioned hearing held before Judge J. Dennis
Frederick was transcribed by me from a videotape
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the best
of my ability.
Signed this 24th day of November 2000 in Sandy,
Utah,
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ADDENDUM C

NISA J. SISNEROS (6654)
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

:

MOTION TO CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCE

Plaintiff,
-v-

:

JOSE LUIS CASTRO VICENTE,

:

Defendant.

:

Case No. 991907447FS
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Defendant, Jose Luis Castro Vicente, by and through counsel, Nisa J. Sisneros, hereby objects
to the sentence imposed by the court on September 22,2000 and moves the court to correct it's
illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, State v.
Wagstaff. 772 P.2d 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah
1996). Mr. Vicente was not present at the sentencing. The court found that he had voluntarily
absented himself from the proceedings and sentenced him to the maximum jail sentence allowed
by law. However, Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states a defendant is
entitled to "make a statement and to present any mitigation of punishment, or show any legal
cause why sentence should not be imposed". Any imposition of sentence without Mr. Vicente's
presence violated his rights to due process and to allocution as found in the Constitution of Utah

art. I, §§ 7 & 12, and the 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. In
addition counsel for Mr. Vicente was not given the opportunity to address sentencing. At the
time of sentencing both the court and counsel were unaware as to why Mr. Vicente was not
present.
Rule 22 (b) allows the court to issue a bench warrant if a defendant fails to appear for
sentencing. Therefore, Mr. Vicente requests that the court correct it's sentence and issue a bench
warrant for his arrest allowing him to address the court prior to being sentenced.
Mr. Vicente requests the court set this matter for hearing.

DATED this 27th day of September, 2000.

Nfc^J.SISMEROS
Attorney forlJDefendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office,
231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this

day of September, 2000.

ADDENDUM D

f U D DISTBICT COURT
Third t"-""cial Dlstriot

OCT-4
DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
KEVIN MURPHY, 5768
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER SENTENCING
DEFENDANT IN ABSENTIA

-vs-

JOSE LUIS C. VICENTE,
Defendant.

Case No. < ? 3 1 ^ 0 1 4 4 7

DA Case Mo. 9900+536
[Hon. Judge Frederick

This case was called for sentencing on September 22, 2000. The State was represented
by Kevin Murphy of the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office; defense counsel Nisa
Sisneros was present. However, defendant did not appear. The court enters the following—
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Court record reflects, and the Court finds, that defendant had written and oral
notice of the September 22, 2000, 8:30 AM sentencing hearing.
2. The Court finds that defendant has voluntarily absented him/herself from the sentencing
hearing.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b), it is appropriate that the defendant be sentenced in
absentia.

ORDERS
1. Based upon his conviction for Attempted Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent
to Distribute, a class A misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of one year
in the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Center.
2. The defendant is sentenced to pay a fine of $2500.00.
3. A no-bail warrant is issued for the defendant's arrest.
4. Defendant's one year jail commitment shall commence upon his/her arrest and booking
into the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Center on the warrant.
is j ^ d a y of Septarotr, 2000.
DATED this
BY T$E COURT

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order Sentencing Defendant in Absentia was delivered to Nisa
Sisneros, Attorney for Defendant Jose Vicente at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111 on the^T day of September, 2000.
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ADDENDUM E

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 17. The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial
with the following exceptions:
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence;
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present;

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be
issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with
the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court
shall so specify in the sentencing order.
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.)

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec 7. [Due process of lawJ
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

coNsmrniON OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

